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EKSPROPRIASI PEMEGANG SAHAM MINORITI: SATU KAJIAN FIRMA 
MILIK KELUARGA DI MALAYSIA 
ABSTRAK 
Berasaskan data panel seimbang untuk 191 buah syarikat awam milik keluarga yang 
tersenarai di Papan Utama Bursa Malaysia antara tahun 2002 dan 2007, kajian ini 
meneliti sama ada pemegang saham minoriti telah diekspropriasi oleh pengarah 
eksekutif melalui penetapan ganjaran pengarah.  Ia juga bertujuan untuk menentukan 
komponen mana ganjaran pengarah telah digunakan sebagai cara ekspropriasi; dan 
pada tahap mana pemilikan saham pengurus telah berlakunya ekspropriasi.  
Pemeriksaan masalah penyelidikan ini adalah berdasarkan teori kuasa pengurusan 
yang meramalkan kejadian ekspropriasi diberi ciri-ciri firma milik keluarga di 
Malaysia.  Antara ciri-ciri yang memberi insentif ekspropriasi termasuk perbezaan 
hak aliran tunai dan hak kawalan, penglibatan pemegang saham kawalan dalam 
pengurusan firma, dan kehadiran ahli keluarga dalam lembaga pengarah.  Analisis 
regresi menunjukkan bahawa gaji telah digunakan sebagai cara ekspropriasi antara 
tahap pemilikan saham pengurus 23 – 76%.  Kejadian ekspropriasi pada tahap 
pertengahan pemilikan saham ini adalah disebabkan oleh kesan pengubuan pengurus 
yang dikemukakan oleh teori kuasa pengurusan.  Namun pada tahap pemilikan 
saham pengurus di bawah 23% (tahap rendah) dan ke atas 76% (tahap tinggi), kesan 
penjajaran kepentingan berkaitan dengan pemilikan saham pengurus menyebabkan 
paras gaji yang lebih rendah dibayar kepada pengarah eksekutif.  Oleh itu, terdapat 
perhubungan yang bukan linear antara gaji pengarah dan pemilikan saham pengurus 
dengan menggunakan model regresi kesan tetap.  Sebaliknya, bonus pengarah tidak 
dipengaruhi oleh pemilikan saham pengurus pada seluruh tahapnya, malah ia adalah 
berkaitan secara positif kepada prestasi firma.  Prestasi firma yang tidak berkaitan 
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secara positif dengan gaji pengarah mengesahkan kejadian ekspropriasi.  Dari 
perspektif tadbir urus korporat, jawatankuasa ganjaran berupaya menyederhanakan 
bonus pengarah tetapi bukan untuk hal gaji dan jumlah ganjaran tunai pengarah.  Dan 
pengarah bebas tidak dapat memainkan peranan dalam menyederhanakan gaji 
pengarah kerana nisbah rendah mereka dalam lembaga pengarah.  Reformasi tadbir 
urus korporat yang tidak berkesan berurusan dengan penumpuan tinggi pemilikan 
saham dan ketidak-pemisahan pengurusan dari kawalan syarikat mungkin telah 
menjejaskan keberkesanannya dalam mempengaruhi ganjaran pengarah.  
Berdasarkan dapatan kajian ini, ia mencadangkan bahawa pemberitahuan ganjaran 
pengarah eksekutif individu perlu dibuat wajib oleh pihak berkuasa.  
Memperkenalkan aktivisme pemegang saham seperti “Say-on-Pay”, meningkatkan 
nisbah pengarah bukan eksekutif bebas dalam lembaga pengarah, dan meninggikan 
komponen gaji berubah ganjaran pengarah adalah langkah-langkah yang berkesan 
dalam melegakan ekspropriasi oleh pengarah eksekutif firma milik keluarga 
Malaysia.    
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EXPROPRIATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: A STUDY OF 
FAMILY-OWNED FIRMS IN MALAYSIA 
ABSTRACT 
Based on a balance panel data of 191 family-owned public companies listed on the 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia between 2002 and 2007, this study examines whether 
minority shareholders have been expropriated by executive directors via the setting 
of directors’ remuneration.  It also seeks to determine which component of directors’ 
remuneration has been used as the means of expropriation; and at which managerial 
ownership levels has expropriation taken place.  Examination of these research 
problems is based on the premise of managerial power theory which predicts the 
occurrence of expropriation given the characteristics of family-owned firms in 
Malaysia.  Among those characteristics that provide the incentives for expropriation 
include divergence of cash flow and control rights, involvement of controlling 
shareholders in the firm management, and the presence of family members in the 
board of directors.  The regression analysis shows that salary has been used as the 
means of expropriation between managerial ownership levels 23 – 76%.  The 
occurrence of expropriation at this medium ownership level is due to the managerial 
entrenchment effect postulated by managerial power theory.  Nevertheless at 
managerial ownership levels below 23% (low level) and above 76% (high level), the 
alignment of interest effect associated with managerial ownership brings about a 
lower level of salary paid to executive directors.  Hence there is a non-linear 
relationship between directors’ salary and managerial ownership by using the fixed 
effect regression model.  On the contrary, directors’ bonus is not affected by 
managerial ownership at all its levels, and instead it is positively linked to firm 
performance.  Firm performance which is not positively associated with directors’ 
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salary reaffirms the occurrence of expropriation.  From the perspective of corporate 
governance, remuneration committee is able to moderate downward directors’ bonus 
but not for the case of directors’ salary and total cash remuneration.  And 
independent directors are not able to play its role in moderating downward directors’ 
salary because of their lower proportion on the board.  Corporate governance reforms 
which do not effectively deal with high ownership concentration and non separation 
of management from control might have undermined its effectiveness in affecting 
directors’ remuneration.  Based on the findings of this study, it is suggested that 
disclosure of individual executive director’s remuneration should be made mandatory 
by the authorities.  Introducing shareholder activism such as Say-on-Pay, increasing 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board, and raising the 
variable pay components of executive remuneration are the effective measures in 
mitigating expropriation by executive directors of family-owned Malaysian firms.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
 Managerial power theory postulates that executive directors by using their 
executive power are able to extract executive pay that is both inappropriately high and 
has inappropriately low levels of incentives (Core et al. 2005).  These non optimal 
executive compensation practices are a form of rent extraction which expropriates the 
wealth of minority shareholders. 
 Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) who propagated the managerial power theory 
argue that managerial power is the source of this expropriation.  Because of this 
managerial power, board of directors of public companies has become not independent 
and is closely linked to their executive directors.  Managerial power has also weakened 
the independent status and power of compensation committee in its pay negotiations 
with the executives.  It has resulted in executive compensation that does not vary 
sufficiently with firm performance. 
 The hypothesis of managerial power theory is not without its relevance given the 
characteristics of family-owned public corporations in Malaysia.  A family firm refers to 
a business enterprise in which at least 50% of the ownership and management falls in the 
hands of the family members either related by blood or marriage (Lee-Chua 1997).  In 
the Asian developing economies, the predominant form of median and large scale 
enterprises is the family-owned or controlled firm (Khan 2000).     
Malaysia also had very high percentage of family-owned businesses as 80% of 
the 890 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia were family companies (Noor 2008).  
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Ownership of Malaysian family companies was highly concentrated where the largest 
shareholder (top 3 shareholders) owned 61.58% of the companies’ outstanding shares 
(Roszaini Haniffa and Mohammad Hudaib 2006).  And majority of the ownership was in 
the hands of family members (Noor and Ayoib 2011).  These majority shareholders had 
garnered considerable managerial power from their inside ownership (shares held by 
officers, directors, their immediate families, as well as shares held in trust and shares 
held by companies controlled by the same parties – Claessens and Yurtoglu 2012) or 
managerial ownership which stood at 35% (Chu 2007) and 34.53% (Roszaini Haniffa 
and Mohammad Hudaib 2006) respectively.       
This level of inside/managerial ownership provides the clout to majority 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders – the typical case of Type II agency 
conflicts where majority shareholders who may be closely involved in the day-to-day 
management and operations of the firm expropriate minority shareholders (Cheah et al. 
2012).  With regards to directors’ remuneration, expropriation can manifest in the form 
of majority shareholders (who are the executive directors) drawing high remuneration to 
enrich themselves at the expense of minority shareholders (Basu et al. 2007; Cheung et 
al. 2005; Jiang and Peng 2011; Young et al. 2008).         
Probability for the occurrence of expropriation is further heightened if good 
management and corporate governance practices are not observed or being sullied by the 
managerial power of majority shareholders in Malaysian family companies.  Openness 
in business practices, separation of the post of CEO and board Chairman, and 
appointment of sufficient number of truly independent non-executive directors to the 
company board are among the good management and corporate governance practices 
that public listed companies need to adopt in order to protect minority shareholders’ 
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interests and mitigate Type II agency conflicts.  These good practices of corporate 
governance help to define clear responsibilities and differentiate the role of directing and 
governance (of the board of directors) from the top management (Goh 2008).  With 
these checks and balances undertaken by the board of directors, there will be no one 
person having unfettered power to carry out the acts of expropriation in the business 
firm.      
Nevertheless Malaysian family-owned firms are not in favour of adopting and 
adhering to these good practices of corporate governance.  For instance, Malaysian 
family firms did not embrace openness in their business practices and still adopted a 
similar business culture to the founders (Ow-Yong and Cheah 2000) despite substantial 
changes in the business environments.  And founders controlled family firms normally 
practiced paternalistic management style which was characterised by hierarchical 
relationships, top management control of power and authority, close supervision and 
distrust of outsiders (Dyer 1986).      
Some Malaysian firms were found prefer to practice duality leadership (the post 
of CEO and Chairman are hold by one person) which gave greater power to the same 
person who was normally the owner as well as manager of the family firm (Noor and 
Ayoib 2011).  Although consolidation of power through this duality leadership could 
help to protect family legacy (Chen et al. 2005) and provide greater power to determine 
company strategies (Davis et al. 1997), it also erodes the influence and ability of 
independent directors to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders.    
The influence and ability of independent non-executive directors to mitigate 
Type II agency conflicts and expropriation are further dampened down and curtailed by 
the doubts cast on the independence status of non-executive directors appointed (Siow 
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2009), family businesses preferred to have family members on the board rather than 
independent outside directors (Fazilah M. et al. 2008), and the presence of independent 
non-executive directors was just to fulfill the requirement of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG).  As such executive directors were expected to 
dominate the discussions in the board meetings (Noor and Ayoib 2011) which are to the 
detriment of minority shareholders’ interests.  The power and influence of majority 
shareholders of Malaysian family-owned firms are so substantial and pervasive that 
remuneration committee – the front line defence against remuneration expropriation has 
faltered in fulfilling its important duty.  Remuneration committee in family-owned firms 
had even used by family members for expropriation via the remuneration process 
(Syaiful Baharee Jaafar et al. 2011).          
In view of the probable occurrence of expropriation, business and investment 
publications weekly such as The Edge Malaysia on several occasions had criticized 
some Malaysian firms on the remuneration paid to their directors.  For instance, Barrock 
(2002) criticized that one company in Malaysia did not pay any dividends to its 
shareholders for several years but its director received more than comfortable salaries.  
In another occasion, Tan (2002) revealed that a CEO was paid more than RM1 million 
while the company suffered a loss and the auditor did not form an opinion.  There were 
also malpractices and impropriety in terms of executive pay structure, link between 
executive pay and company performance, and disclosure of directors’ remuneration.     
Is high and excessive executive remuneration common among Malaysian public 
firms?  Are the criticisms of malpractices and impropriety concerning executive 
remuneration largely isolated cases and only confined to a few unethical firms or “bad 
apples”?  Or are these criticisms on executive pay conveyed the message and served as 
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the signal for the occurrence of the more profound Type II agency conflicts – 
expropriation of minority shareholders by owner-managers of Malaysian family-owned 
firms via the setting of director remuneration?   
Academic studies should be carried out to examine these critical issues which 
have not been adequately dealt with empirically for Malaysian family-owned firms.  
Hence the main theme of the present study is to examine the issues of expropriation of 
minority shareholders from the perspective of executive remuneration – its occurrence 
and element of remuneration which is subject to expropriation, the thresholds of 
managerial ownership levels which prompt the occurrence of expropriation, and the 
effect of corporate governance practices adopted by Malaysian family-owned public 
firms to mitigate such expropriation.   
1.2 Issues Surrounding Executive Directors’ Remuneration of Malaysian Public   
         Corporations 
 
 Although the issues of excessive director remuneration of local public 
corporations were less serious as compared to those in the Western countries, some 
malpractices and impropriety concerning remuneration paid to executive directors of 
Malaysian public corporations had been criticized by certain quarters.  These 
malpractices and impropriety encompassed three aspects namely (i) linkage between 
compensation and firm performance, (ii) compensation structure, and (iii) disclosure of 
executive directors’ remuneration. 
i.  Linkage between Compensation and Firm Performance 
 Agency theory suggests that executive remuneration should be linked to firm 
performance as a means to align the interests of shareholders and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  Nevertheless for the case of Malaysian firms, some studies had shown 
6 
                                                                                 
that the linkage between executive remuneration and firm performance was either non-
existence or rather weak.  For instance, Shamsul (2006) in his study on directors’ 
remuneration of Malaysian companies found that directors’ remuneration was not 
associated with firm profitability as measured by return on asset (ROA).  When lagged 
firm performance was used as the regressor, a negative and significant association was 
even found between directors’ remuneration and lagged ROA.   
The negative relationship between remuneration and firm profitability was also 
observed by Mohammad Talha and Abdullah Sallehhuddin (2007).  They revealed that 
out of 488 companies listed in Bursa Malaysia, 40 of them encountered losses in 2005, 
but still increased their directors’ remuneration.  On the other hand, Salleh Hassan et al. 
(2003) found a positive but weak relationship between Malaysian directors’ 
remuneration and firm performance for time periods before and during the Asian 
financial crisis.  They attributed this weak relationship to the prevailing corporate 
governance structures of Malaysian firms which did not pay much emphasis to the 
efficient contracting proposition advocated by the agency theory.             
 The survey conducted by Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) and 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) (MSWG and UiTM 2007) to examine the 
correlation between directors’ remuneration and firm performance also revealed that 
sectors that paid on average low directors’ remuneration generally had higher gross 
profit margin.  But in many cases sectors that rewarded large directors’ remuneration 
registered low gross profit margin.  Because of this negative relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and gross profit margin, it was suspected that there were some 
other non-financial factors that had exerted greater influence on the remuneration policy 
in those firms that displayed this irregular relationship. 
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ii.  Compensation Structure 
 In order to ensure managers operate firms to maximize shareholder wealth, 
agency theory suggests that compensation plan should link management’s compensation 
to the firm’s performance.  Two possible ways of linking compensation to performance 
are (i) making a greater percentage of a manager’s compensation equity-based through 
incentive stock options, and (ii) salaries, bonuses, and stock options can be designed to 
provide big rewards for superior performance and big penalties for poor performance 
(Jensen and Murphy 2010).   
 In the case of Malaysian public listed companies, the compensation structure of 
executive directors was mostly fixed rather than variable or dependent on firm 
performance.  For instance, Singam (2003) observed that the chairman, CEOs and 
directors of Malaysian firms were mostly paid in fixed salaries.  There were only a few 
companies where CEOs and directors get a fixed salary plus performance-related pay 
including stock options.  The Directors’ Remuneration Survey 2006 conducted by 
KPMG for 1,000 Malaysian public listed companies revealed that only 30% of the 
companies surveyed were making use of annual bonus to link directors’ remuneration to 
firm performance (KPMG 2006).  In an earlier survey conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers on remuneration and practices of Malaysian board of directors, 
the percentage of firms which utilized employees’ shares options schemes as a means to 
link pay to performance was even lower at 18% (PricewaterhouseCoopers Malaysia 
2001).         
Norsiah and Seelen (2003) also observed that a large portion of top executive 
compensation was based on base salary or allowances that were guaranteed regardless of 
the performance of the company.  Their compensation was driven by position and 
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market value rather than results.  This undesirable phenomenon of high fixed 
compensation and low variable pay was substantiated by the 2006 Total Rewards Survey 
conducted by Watson Wyatt (Nath and Lee 2007).  The survey showed that for the top 
management in Malaysia, about 66% of their compensation was comprised of 
guaranteed pay, and only about 20% was variable pay.  This top management included 
the executive directors who were accorded full benefits as salaried employees because of 
their higher level of responsibilities and involvement in the companies.  This high 
proportion of fixed pay is very much in the favour of entrenched managers, as they may 
bias their compensation structure towards low risk components that are not influenced 
by performance (Toyne et al. 2000).        
 The fixed compensation or salary of Malaysian executive directors was also 
found to be rather “sticky” or inflexible downwards.  Suria Majdi and Rashidah (2010) 
found that only those Malaysian firms that faced with the problems of fraud and lawsuit 
reduced their executives’ remuneration by 6% in the second year after the fraud and 
lawsuit revelation; while non-fraud and non-lawsuit firms still increased executives’ 
remuneration by 8.08% during the same period.   
This finding showed that Malaysian firms would only “discipline” their 
executive directors when they had committed grave and serious mistakes or indulged in 
misconducts or offences that were punishable under the law and irked the public.  
Executive directors of Malaysian firms were rarely disciplined in terms of salary 
reduction due to poor performance of firms.  Hence it could be surmised that Malaysian 
firms were still some distance away from closely aligning the interests of managers to 
shareholders in terms of compensation structure as advocated by the agency theorists.                 
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iii.  Disclosure of Executive Directors’ Remuneration 
 Disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration is vital as it provides the 
information needed to evaluate the tie between remuneration and corporate performance, 
and whether the company is protecting the interests of minority shareholders by 
adopting appropriate remuneration policy.  In particular when there is a mismatch 
between remuneration and corporate performance, disclosure of executive remuneration 
can help to highlight weak boards as well as enable shareholders to determine whether 
resources of the firm are being appropriately expended. 
 In terms of disclosure of directors’ remuneration, starting from the financial year 
ended 30th June 2001 public listed companies in Malaysia were required to disclose the 
remuneration paid to their directors under the Revamped Listing Requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) – Paragraph 15.25 and 
15.26.  Companies were required to disclose the total amount paid to their directors; and 
the components of directors’ remuneration were to be itemized separately.  In the case of 
shares or share options rewarded to company directors, the names of the relevant 
directors together with the details of the share acquisition, the number and class of 
shares given to them had to be provided by the company in its annual accounts (Pascoe 
1999).      
Such disclosure is in accordance with the principle and best practice for good 
corporate governance recommended by the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
2000 (MCCG 2000) (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance 2001).  Nevertheless 
even in the recently launched MCCG 2012, it is still not mandatory for public 
corporations to disclose how much each director is being remunerated, as well as the 
components of remuneration given to individual director.  Thus disclosure of any such 
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information is considered as voluntary disclosure beyond the mandatory requirements of 
the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia and MCCG.  In addition Malaysian public 
listed companies were not required to disclose the value of share options given to their 
directors (Pascoe 1999).  Besides that these companies were also not required to disclose 
share options as a part of their directors’ remuneration (ibid.).      
Because of such voluntary nature of disclosure, only very small numbers of 
Malaysian firms had disclosed the remuneration paid to their directors and its 
components on an individual basis.  For instance, Rashidah et al. (2005) found that in 
2002 only 8.9% or 22 companies disclosed the exact amount of individual directors’ 
remuneration; while the figure for such companies was only 8 in 2001.  The percentage 
of companies which disclosed the remuneration of their individual director still remained 
fairly low between 2009 and 2011.  Out of a total of 899 (in 2009), 898 (in 2010), and 
864 (in 2011) Malaysian public listed companies surveyed by the Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group (MSWG), only 5.2%, 5.6%, and 8.3% disclosed such information in 
2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively (MSWG 2012).  For those companies which did not 
disclose their individual director remuneration, security was cited as the main reason for 
not revealing such information in their annual reports.             
When Malaysian firms are less transparent in disclosing individual executive 
directors’ remuneration, shareholders are being deprived of an essential piece of 
information to evaluate the link between remuneration paid to an executive director and 
firm performance.  This lack of transparency provides the opportunity for controlling 
shareholders/insiders of Malaysian firms to maximize their private benefits of control at 
the expense of minority shareholders (Thillainathan 1999).  
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 Weak linkage between executive pay and firm performance, high proportion of 
fixed compensation, and scant disclosure of individual director remuneration are not in 
the best interests of the minority shareholders of Malaysian public corporations at all.  
These malpractices and impropriety might even be perceived as the signs and indications 
of expropriation of minority shareholders due to the occurrence and manifestation of 
Type II agency problems – owner opportunism or the entrenchment effect (Gilson 2006; 
Villalonga and Amit 2006).  This type of agency problem is more likely to occur in 
family-owned firms with concentrated ownership which dominated the corporate 
landscape in East Asia countries such as Malaysia.           
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
 Malaysia is a country where family firms or family-owned businesses are 
prevalent in the corporate and business world.  Malaysia had the second highest 
percentage of family ownership of listed companies in the region after Indonesia 
according to an article published in the South China Morning Post (dated 28 August 
2002, as cited by Jaggi et al. 2009).  In terms of types of share ownership, family 
ownership constituted over 43% of the main board companies of the Bursa Malaysia 
from 1999 through 2005 (Fazilah M. et al. 2008).  Malaysia also had fairly high 
ownership concentration where the average concentration of the five largest 
shareholders of Malaysian listed companies was 58.84% and 54.85% in 1998 (Abdul 
Hadi et al. 2005) and 2006 (Tam and Tan 2007) respectively.   
Under this scenario of pervasive family ownership and high ownership 
concentration in Malaysia, whether family control mitigates or exacerbates agency 
conflicts within the firm remains an open question (Boubakri et al. 2010).  On one hand, 
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family control brings potential benefits such as higher firm value and operating 
performance which is due to the alignment effect.  It happens as high share ownership 
closely linked the family’s welfare and fortune to firm performance.  On the other hand, 
family ownership may lead to increased potential for expropriation of minority 
shareholder wealth which is due to the entrenchment effect.  This entrenchment effect is 
most likely to happen when the founding family enjoys substantial equity control and 
dominates the board of directors (ibid.).   
Expropriation of minority shareholders can take the form of expropriation of 
cash flows, or assets, or equity, or a combination of two or more of these firm attributes 
(Atanasov et al. 2008).  Cash flow expropriation includes sale of a firm’s output at 
below-market prices to another firm in which the family has significant or complete cash 
flow rights, or overpayment for inputs purchased from such firms.  Cash flow 
expropriation may also in the form of excessive salaries or perquisites for family 
members or insiders (Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2010). 
 Besides high ownership concentration, Malaysia public corporations were also 
characterized by significant divergence between cash flow rights (indicate the ownership 
of firms) and the control or voting rights (indicate actual control of firms) of the 
controlling shareholders in family firms (Krishnamurti et al. 2003).  This divergence 
which is resulted from the use of dual class shares, pyramids and cross-holding 
ownership structures to retain control over family companies (Bhaumik and Gregoriou 
2010) provides the incentives for controlling shareholders to indulge in expropriation.  It 
happens as these types of ownership structures enable controlling shareholders to 
exercise large control/voting rights and gain much benefit from expropriation despite 
their small cash flow rights – the typical “heads I win, tail you lose” scenario.    
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 The likelihood of expropriation and the extent of its negative repercussions 
would be largely reduced and contained if there were good corporate governance system 
and structure in place to monitor the behaviour of public listed corporations in the 
country.  Since Malaysia embarked on its corporate governance reforms shortly after the 
Asian Financial Crisis 1997, it had achieved considerable good progress as was 
evidenced from the relatively high score achieved in the Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) – a series of reports on corporate governance published by 
the World Bank (McGee 2010).   
Malaysia was also placed at fairly good position among 10 Asian countries in the 
2003 to 2005 Corporate Governance Watch (CG Watch) reports published jointly by the 
Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA) (Roche 2005).  CG Watch ranks a country’s CG score based on five criteria 
namely rules and regulations (15%), enforcement (25%), political and regulatory (20%), 
adoption of international accounting standards (20%), and institutional landscape and 
CG culture (20%). 
Even though Malaysia enjoyed fairly good performance in terms of CG score, 
various weaknesses had also been identified for the CG system and structure in the 
country by ACGA and CLSA.  These weaknesses included securities laws which did not 
deter insider trading; limited legal remedies for shareholders; suspicion about the true 
“independence” of independent non-executive directors (INEDs); and limited private 
enforcement by the market especially at both the institutional and retail level, (CLSA 
2007, p.25).   
Several academicians had also pointed out some shortcomings and inadequacies 
of the corporate governance reforms undertaken by the Malaysian government.  For 
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instance legal loophole pertaining to the definition of director remuneration only allowed 
shareholders to approve the proposal put forward for directors’ fees instead of directors’ 
remuneration during the shareholders’ annual general meeting (Mohammad Talha et al. 
2009a).  Corporate governance reforms in the country were also perceived as ineffective 
because it only solicited “form over substance” kind of compliance from public 
corporations.  Local firms only complied by merely confirming to whatever reporting 
and legal requirements stated in the MCCG rather than undertook the real and genuine 
changes that were needed for improving governance standards (Liew 2008).   
Although the emphasis of MCCG was on “disclosure”, not much headway had 
been achieved especially with regards to directors’ remuneration and other benefits 
received by directors – the lack of transparency of company annual report (Aida Maria 
Ismail et al. 2010).  Several research findings had even shown that the low level of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate information which included executive remuneration 
was associated with high ownership concentration (Sheila Nu 2012), prevalent of 
family-owned business (Roszaini Haniffa and Cooke 2002), and higher percentage of 
family members sat on the board (Wan Izyani Adilah and Zunaidah 2010) of Malaysian 
firms. 
1.4 Research Problems and Research Objectives 
The above discussions showed that family-owned Malaysian firms are associated 
with high ownership concentration, divergence of cash flow and control rights, and the 
dominance of family members on the company board.  These characteristics provide the 
required conditions and incentives for expropriation of minority shareholders by owner-
managers of Malaysian family-owned firms.  The malpractices and impropriety on 
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executive remuneration as revealed by several surveys and academic studies seemed to 
suggest that expropriation could have taken place among public corporations in the 
country.   
Although MCCG provides several guidelines of good corporate governance 
practices for the determination of executive pay for instance, linking executive directors’ 
remuneration to firm performance, and the setting up of remuneration committee where 
majority of members are to be comprised of independent-non executive directors 
(INEDs) to oversee matters related to executive pay, its effectiveness might be 
undermined by the shortcomings and inadequacies of corporate governance reforms (as 
pointed out by some academicians), and the high managerial power of majority 
shareholders of family-owned firms in Malaysia.                    
Based on these observations on executive remuneration and the scenario 
surrounding corporate governance reforms in the country as well as high managerial 
power, there is a need for an academic study to examine the issues of expropriation 
based on the theoretical framework of Type II agency conflicts which is inherent in 
family-owned firms – in particular from the perspective of the alignment and 
entrenchment effects of managerial ownership on executive remuneration.  The present 
study would like to fill up the gap of academic research in this area as there has been 
little discussion about expropriation in terms of executive directors of family-owned 
public listed companies setting their own levels of remuneration in Malaysia.   
In view of the issues discussed above, the following research problems would be 
worthy of further investigation.  
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1. Do majority shareholders of Malaysian family-owned public corporations who 
normally assume the position of executive directors expropriate minority 
shareholders by setting their own levels of remuneration through the 
managerial power conferred by their share ownership in the firms? 
2. Which remuneration component – salary, bonus or total cash remuneration is 
used as the means of expropriation by executive directors on minority 
shareholders? 
3. At which ownership levels does the entrenchment effect of managerial 
ownership which signifies expropriation of minority shareholders via the 
managerial power of executive directors occur? 
With these research problems in mind, the present study would like to attain the 
following research objectives: 
1. To determine whether expropriation does exist in Malaysian family-owned 
public listed companies by examining the relationship between managerial 
ownership and executive directors’ remuneration.  
2. To examine the relationship between managerial ownership and directors’ 
remuneration which is measured in terms of salary, bonus and total cash 
remuneration. 
3. To estimate the managerial ownership levels in which expropriation of 
minority shareholders has occurred via the managerial power of executive 
directors of family-owned Malaysian firms. 
1.5   Significance of the Study 
 The study of expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders of 
family-owned Malaysian firms via executive remuneration is significant to stakeholders 
17 
                                                                                 
such as company management and board of directors, policy makers, general public 
investors and academicians.  
 The presence of remuneration expropriation serves as the evidence as well as 
reminder especially to independent directors in the remuneration committee that 
managerial power is very much alive and lurking in family-owned Malaysian firms.  If 
independent directors of remuneration committee are not able to resolutely and 
conscientiously uphold the task of protecting minority shareholders’ interests, they could 
easily fall victim to managerial power and become the potent tool for expropriation.  As 
such arm’s length negotiation (refers to contracting between executives attempting to get 
the best possible deal for themselves and boards trying to get the best deal for 
shareholders – Bebchuk and Fried 2005) is the golden rule and moral law that 
independent directors of remuneration committee should observe and uphold at all 
times. 
 The conscience and resolution of independent directors alone might not be 
sufficient to withstand the intrusion of managerial power.  This study helps to shed light 
on the possible loopholes and weaknesses in Malaysian corporate governance policies 
and practices that might actually exacerbate rather than mitigate remuneration 
expropriation.  Based on the findings of this study, appropriate amendments and 
improvements could be undertaken by policy makers to further fortify and strengthen the 
structures, crucial functions and responsibilities entrusted to remuneration committee – 
the front line defense against expropriation. 
 Identification of the managerial ownership levels that prompt the occurrence of 
expropriation provides the essential information for making sound equity investment to 
the general public investors.  This information helps retail investors to avoid investing in 
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family firms where the managerial ownership of majority shareholders falls within these 
perilous levels or thresholds.  Firms that do not adopt good corporate governance 
practices are expected to show below average or dismayed accounting and stock market 
performance.  What more when expropriation is predicted to occur in family firms that 
exhibit these perilous levels of managerial ownership.  Public investors are also not 
willing to pay any price premium for shares of family companies that are suspicious of 
expropriating minority shareholders.        
 Academicians might have the interest to know the findings of this study as 
expropriation of minority shareholders via the setting of directors’ remuneration is rarely 
examined empirically for family-owned companies in Malaysia.  The empirical evidence 
of remuneration expropriation, managerial entrenchment effect of majority shareholders’ 
managerial ownership, and the related issues of corporate governance and business 
practices of family-owned firms enrich the understanding on the manifestation of Type 
II agency conflicts in Asian emerging economies.  This understanding provides the basis 
and serves as the platform for further improving and strengthening the practice of 
corporate governance in the effort of mitigating expropriation of minority shareholders 
by majority shareholders of Malaysian family-owned firms.            
1.6 Scope of the Study 
This study focuses on family-owned public corporations listed in the main board 
of Bursa Malaysia whose business activities are involved in five main sectors namely 
construction, trading and services, properties, consumer products, and industrial 
products.  The main reason for choosing these five sectors is to make the sample firms 
more uniform and thus helps to reduce potential biases that would arise due to a mix of 
relatively incompatible sectors (Dogan and Smyth 2002).  This study does not include 
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firms that operate in finance, plantation, and mining sectors.  The reason is these sectors 
used different accounting procedures than those in other sectors. 
 This study mainly focuses on public listed firms which are owned by 
individuals/families and other public corporations.  It is because there are higher chances 
for the occurrence of expropriation in these individuals/families firms; and public 
corporations that exhibit controlling-minority structures in the form of cross-holdings 
and pyramid ownership structures which are closely related to family-owned enterprises. 
However this study does not include public corporations that are owned by government 
or its agencies, government related companies, companies that are owned by local and 
foreign institutional investors, and foreign companies.  The rationale is these types of 
public corporations might adopt different remuneration policies towards their executives 
as compared to firms that are owned by individuals/families or family-owned 
companies.                     
   The time period which this study investigates is from 2002 to 2007.  The reason 
for choosing this time period is because Malaysian public listed firms are only required 
to disclose the remuneration paid to their executive and non-executive directors starting 
from the financial year ended 30th June 2001.  Before that listed companies only 
disclosed the aggregate remuneration paid to directors without distinguishing between 
executive and non-executive directors.  Further explanations on the choice of time 
period of study are provided in section 4.4 of the chapter on methodologies. 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
 This study is organized into six chapters.  Following this introduction, chapter 
two provides the main concepts and theories employed in this study.  It includes an 
introduction to executive remuneration and description on different components of 
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remuneration given to executives.  It is followed by discussions on the various 
theoretical perspectives in which executive remuneration has been examined – in 
particular from the viewpoint of managerial power theory and agency theory.  This 
chapter also discusses corporate governance reforms in Malaysia, and what are the likely 
impacts on directors’ remuneration of public listed companies in the country.   
  Chapter three presents the literature review on executive directors’ remuneration 
and its relationship with managerial or insider ownership and firm performance.  This 
chapter discusses the alignment of interest and managerial entrenchment effects that are 
associated with managerial ownership and its implications on directors’ remuneration.  
The non-linear relationship between directors’ remuneration as an agency cost and 
managerial ownership is also elaborated in this chapter.   
Chapter four describes the methodologies and outlines the research hypotheses 
that will direct the investigation.  This chapter specifies variables, models, and tests to 
analyse the data.  It also develops a set of testable hypotheses which examine the impact 
of managerial power, internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, and 
economic characteristics of firms such as firm performance on executive directors’ 
remuneration.      
Chapter five reports the main statistical findings for executive remuneration.  It 
also discusses the main findings of the study using the concepts and theories outlined in 
chapters 2 and 3.  The two chosen theoretical models (the managerial power theory and 
agency theory) are used as the main framework for the presentation of results.  
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The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of chapter 5 and offers some 
implications for policy regulation.  This chapter also identifies the limitations of the 
study as well as makes recommendations for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter provides the main concepts and theories employed in this study, and 
also a brief description of corporate governance reforms that Malaysia has undertaken.   
Section 2.2 introduces the topic of executive remuneration.  Section 2.3 describes the 
different components of remuneration accorded to executives.  Section 2.4 relates the 
concepts of executive remuneration and its various components to the scope of study of 
this thesis.  Section 2.5 discusses the major perspectives in which executive 
remuneration has been examined.  Section 2.6 addresses two prominent theoretical 
models – managerial power theory and agency theory which explain the relationship 
among executive pay, managerial ownership and firm performance from their specific 
perspectives.  These two theoretical models also form the basis of analysing the 
relationship among directors’ remuneration, managerial ownership, corporate 
governance, and firm performance in this study.  After looking at the theoretical models 
of executive remuneration, section 2.7 discusses important determinants of executive 
remuneration.  Section 2.8 looks at corporate governance reforms in Malaysia and 
makes inferences on its probable influence on executive directors’ remuneration.  
Section 2.9 summarizes this chapter. 
2.2 Executive Remuneration 
 Executive remuneration refers to the rewards or pays given to the executives of 
firms.  Employees who constitute the category of “executives” vary from country to 
country.  In the United States, executives or rather senior executives refer to the chief 
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executive officer (CEO), chief operating officer (COO), chief financial officer (CFO), 
chief technology officer, and heads and directors of various departments and divisions 
(Pepper 2006).  But in United Kingdom and Europe, executives are referred in particular 
to members of the “executive committee”, “general management committee”, or 
“executive board” (ibid.).  From these definitions it could be said that executives 
generally refer to the top management of firms.  In the context of the present study, 
executive directors of Malaysian public corporations are categorized under “executives” 
as those used in the United Kingdom.        
 From the viewpoint of the whole business organization, executive remuneration 
is a subset of employee remuneration.  Like employee remuneration, it is driven by the 
business and human resources strategies of firms which aim to achieve organizational 
excellence which encompasses three essential goals namely (i) continuous stakeholder 
satisfaction, (ii) perpetual competitive advantage, and (iii) sustained employer of choice 
(Berger 2008).  Besides organizational excellence, maximizing the long-run total value 
of firm or “enlightened value maximization” has also been suggested as one of the 
important bases on which executive remuneration should be based (Jensen and Murphy 
2004).          
 Besides its important impacts on the attainment of organizational goals and 
success, executive remuneration is also regarded as one of the most important incentives 
that exist in business organizations.  This incentive which is in the form of executive 
remuneration is perceived to have an essential impact on managerial decision making 
and strategy which have important bearing and implications on firm performance 
(Finkelstein and Boyd 1998).   
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Due to its immense influence on business organizations in terms of their survival 
and success, the design of executive remuneration has to give due and appropriate 
considerations to a multitude of factors such as shareholders and rule makers, type of 
company, performance measurements and standards, strategic thinking, market lifecycle, 
board of directors, structural organizational change, and remuneration elements (Ellig 
2007).  Adding to this complexity of designing an optimal executive remuneration 
package, corporate scandals which occurred in Enron, Vivendi, and Skiandia; and ever 
widening gaps between executive and average worker pays in the United States had 
further elevated executive remuneration into the limelight of public debate and scrutiny.     
Indeed from the amount of news coverage given to and extent of research done 
on issues related to executive remuneration, and also the enormous debates and inquiries 
that executive remuneration had entailed, it is appropriate to say that executive 
remuneration is a large and diverse topic which is enormously complex and sometimes 
even emotive (Murphy 1986a; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; Baron and Kreps 1999; 
McKnight and Tomkins 1999).          
2.3 Basic Components of Executive Remuneration        
 The design of executive remuneration usually comprised of four basic elements 
or components.  These elements or components are (i) Salary, (ii) Short-term cash 
incentives, (iii) Long-term cash and equity incentives, and (iv) Benefits and perquisites.  
Graham et al. (2008) further classified salary, short-term cash incentives, and long-term 
cash and equity incentives as total direct cash compensation or remuneration paid to 
executives.  If benefits and perquisites are added to total direct cash compensation or 
